WHAT AM I MISSING?
The River Speaks: A Question I Can't Shake
I expected to already be two essays into my series, The River Speaks.
I figured I would go to New Orleans, then Vicksburg, find my angle, and write about this consequential region of the Confederacy.
Instead, what I found has left me with more questions than answers.
I am doing research now, and I am certain many of my readers can help me.
The number one impression I brought home from this trip is that control of the Mississippi River was absolutely essential to the survival of the Confederacy and any hope of winning the war.
The Union began methodically securing the Mississippi with the capture of New Orleans and Island No. 10 in April 1862. From there, the river campaign unfolded step by step until the Mississippi was finally under Federal control. Whether one agrees with my conclusions or not, it is impossible to deny that the Federals understood what that river meant and took deliberate steps to secure it.
All of my questions stem from there.
The elephant in the room. The uncomfortable question I cannot seem to get away from.
Was the United States actually fighting two wars?
One against Confederate Virginia.
One against the rest of the Confederacy.
I am not making that argument. Not yet.
What surprises me most is that this question never even crossed my mind until two days ago.
I am asking it because the closer I look at the Mississippi, the harder it becomes to ignore.
So I am asking my readers:
What am I missing?
Virginia did, indeed, take troops away from the other theaters of war. Take a look at Longstreet’s participation at Chickamauga. Lee sent men by train to the western theater. It was a while before Longstreet joined Lee again—just in time for the Wilderness Campaign.
See Frank M. Mixson’s Reminiscence of a Private ( available on-line for free, or on Amazon for a few bucks)
For a good example of how Virginia sucked the life out of the Confederacy, take a look at the Sherman’s March to the Sea and the Carolina’s campaign.
In my opinion, if Longstreet’s Corps had been available for deployment in South Carolina, the Union’s invasion of South Carolina in January and February would have been stopped at the Salkehatchie River.
Look at the Battle of Rivers’ Bridge, where General O.O. Howard faced a Confederate position that he called, “ The best for defense I ever saw.”
You’re on the right track with your thinking.
You have stumbled onto what I began to understand earlier in my history career (Had help from some good researchers and professors in that regard). The war in Virginia was essentially a pinning action and in many ways a distraction from the main deal. Sadly the Confederate government never got it. The Yankees got it early on as they themselves desperately needed the Mississippi for navigation and crop delivery. It also helped in the looting of cotton to be sold to support the Republican party and its constituents. Along the Mississippi the Confederacy had two brilliant resourceful commanders in Forrest and Shelby, neither of which were used even remotely to their potential due the ring knocker club and politics. The Trans Mississippi tended to be a dumping ground for the politically connected and militarily inept as commanders go, which Shelby accomplished great things in spite of. The Tennessee saw the same to a lesser degree. I would strongly recommend General Shelby and His Men by Shelby’s Adjutant as a good primary source on the Trans Mississippi. If you are going through Vicksburg you will get lots on the Army of Tennessee (at least when I lived in Mississippi that was the case at the Courthouse Museum. Lamar Roberts, Pemberton SCV Camp member ran it). Thanks for your efforts and work!!!